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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we consider an oligopolistic model of electricity market with conjectures concerning 
the price variations depending upon the agents’ production increase or increase. By introducing 
the notion of an exterior equilibrium and a special type of a producer’s cost function, we establish 
the existence and uniqueness of the exterior (conjectured) equilibrium. Then we introduce the 
notion of an interior stable equilibrium and analyze the behavior of groups of consumers with 
different consumption abilities. The proposed techniques allow us to make a qualitative 
description of dependence of the market price upon the active demand component.   
 
 
Introduction  
 
hen studying the oligopolistic market in the framework of the classical models [1]—[3], besides the 
questions of an equilibrium existence and its computation, a lot of attention is usually paid to comparing 
the latter with the equilibrium in the perfect competition model.  Recently [4]—[5], both models were 
included in a united class of oligopoly models where the degree of influence on the whole situation by each agent is 
modeled by some special parameters (influence coefficients). If we set these influence coefficients in an exogenous 
way, then the demand structure does not affect the production regime, i.e. the dependence of output values upon the 
market price.  Although a deformation of the demand curve leads to a variation of equilibrium, the possible 
modeling of the deformation influence in such models is limited. For example, it is difficult to trace a rapid (or even 
jump-like) variation of the market price, a stable price under the demand growth (within certain limits), and a series 
of other phenomena. 
 
However, if one does not consider the influence coefficients as given beforehand but includes them in the 
definition of the equilibrium itself, together with the equilibrium price and production volumes, one obtains a 
possibility to simulate the above-mentioned effects. Such a notion of equilibrium was introduced in the paper by 
V.A. Bulavsky [6]. There, the influence coefficients are determined by a special verification procedure that checks 
their consistency.  The procedure in [6] supposes that each agent can observe the variations of the aggregate 
production output as a response to his own output variations and thus estimate his influence. The choice of the 
aggregate production volume as the observed parameter was done due to the fact that the classical Cournot model 
was taken as the basis of the developed model. Nevertheless, one can assume that it is more natural to observe the 
market price instead of the aggregate output, and hence estimate each agent’s influence upon the price. Such an 
approach is developed in papers [7] and [9], which allowed to relax the conditions imposed on the demand function 
and keep on in essence only one of them, namely its being non-increasing when the price increases. A technical 
condition for the latter function of being piecewise smooth is also kept valid.  
 
In such a framework in [7] and [9], the equilibrium existence was established, and certain consequences of 
the demand structure variations were examined. Namely, two types of variations were illustrated. The first one is 
related to the fall down of consumption ability of  one group of consumers with the consumption ability of another 
group of consumers kept intact. It turned out that the proposed model predicted three stages of the process: (i) the 
price going down with the aggregate production output kept constant, (ii) the price going down further with the 
simultaneous production decreasing and a deficit arising, (iii) and at last, a sharp jump of the price without 
production growth, and the deficit disappearing on account of the poorer consumers abandoning the market.  
W 
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Before mentioning the second type of the demand structure variations we insert a certain elucidation. In the 
classical oligopoly models, the aggregate bargain volume decreases as the price grows up. This fact goes in line with 
the postulate of the price falling down as the supply increases. However, there exists a dual (in a certain sense) 
postulate: the price increases as the demand goes up. In order to remove this seeming contradiction, one should 
make distinction between two kinds of demand: a passive and an active one.   The standard demand function in the 
classical oligopoly models describes the passive demand: consumers are waiting for a good to be proposed to them 
at some price and then decide to buy it or not to buy. However, the active demand does not depend on the price and 
constitutes the additional component of the aggregate demand.  So when the active demand increases the market 
price should grow up. It is the growth of the active demand component that is the second type of the demand 
structure variations examined in [7] and [9].  The active component may reflect both an agitating demand and the 
demand related to some needs outside the model. For example, it could be a demand arising because of some 
military actions, development of the defense material production, etc.  It was shown in [7] and [9] that the active 
demand growing, in the presence of a group of passive consumers, also provides three phases to be observed: (i) the 
price kept invariable while the production goes up, (ii) the constant price with the constant production volume and 
hence, a deficit appearing, (iii) and at last, the price jumping up as the market is abandoned by the passive 
consumers, and only the active demand is satisfied thereafter.  
 
An interesting phenomenon was also mentioned in [7] and [9]: with both the first and the second type of the 
demand structure variations, the process is not invertible completely. For example, if the leap in price is followed by 
the active demand going down, then the price does not return to the initial level unless the active demand becomes 
lower than the initial one! Similarly, in the second example, the initial price is not reached unless the poorer group is 
drawn up to the state of the richer group but not to the poor initial state.  
 
In the paper, we apply the mathematical model from [7], [9] to an electricity market in which every firm 
producing the electricity may have several generating units. Therefore, their total production cost function is formed 
by minimizing the total production cost. The model is specified in the next section. We prove the existence of 
exterior equilibrium and illustrate that by simple examples.  Then by approximating thus obtained piecewise linear 
total production cost function by a special quadratic function, we are able to introduce the notion of interior 
equilibrium and realize the qualitative analysis of the interactions between the active demand and the equilibrium 
values.  
 
Model Specification 
 
Consider 3n  firms-producers of the electric power numbered by 1i , ,n , and 1 2
i
j , , ,n  denote 
the generating units owned by firm i.  We also introduce the following exogenous variables, decision variables, and 
profits, similar to those in [8]: 
 
             Exogenous variables: 
              
ij
c                                           constant marginal cost of unit  j  owned by firm i 
             
ij
CAP                                      capacity of unit  j  owned by firm i 
            LOSS                                     percentage loss incurred over transmission and distribution  lines  
            
ij
RES _ RATIO                      required reserve ratio for unit  j  owned by firm i 
             
ij
FOR                                     forced outage rate for unit   j  owned by firm i 
             
             Decision variables: 
             
ij
x                                           megawatts (MW) of electricity generated by unit j owned by firm i 
             
ij
xr                                          MW of capacity required for reserves by  unit  j  owned by firm i 
 
Consumers demand is described by a demand function  G p , whose argument p  is the price proposed by 
the producers. An active demand D  is non-negative and does not depend upon the price. The demand function is 
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assumed to be non-negative and non-increasing, and also continuously differentiable everywhere except for a finite 
number of points in which both the function  G p  and its derivative  G' p  may be discontinuous. Because of that, 
we denote by  G p  the demand function’s left limit at the point p , whereas the right limit is denoted by  g p . It 
is straightforward that    G p g p  at the continuity points while    G p g p  at the points of discontinuity. In 
the latter case,  G p  can be treated as the potential market capacity, and  pg  -- as the lower limit of  supply  
preventing the price increase. To describe the model, we introduce the followings groups of constraints. 
 
Demand constraints 
 
The equilibrium between the demand and supply for a given price value p  is stipulated   by the following pair of 
inequalities 
     
1 1
1
inn
ij
i j
g p D x LOSS G p D
 
                        (1) 
 
Reserve constraints 
 
        
1
0      1 2
in
ij ij ij
j
xr RES _ RATIO x i , , ,n

    .                  (2) 
 
Capacity constraints 
 
 1         1 1ij ij ij ij ix xr CAP FOR i , ,n; j , ,n       .                 (3) 
 
Non-negativity constraints 
 
 0   0         
ij ij
x , xr , i , j                        (4) 
 
That is, inequalities (1) model the generation requires to meet demand by adjusting the amount of 
electricity produced by each generating unit by a loss factor LOSS . 
 
The reserve ratio constraints, inequalities (2), require each firm to maintain a spinning reserve to satisfy 
regional reliability requirements. Every firm that generates electricity is required to preserve capacity up to a set 
percentage of electricity it generates  ijRES _ RATIO .  
 
The generation capacity constraints, equations (3), ensure that the sum of the electricity produced by each 
unit 
ij
x  and the capacity used as spinning reserve 
ij
xr  does not exceed the adjusted total capacity 
ij
CAP  of the unit. 
To account for unscheduled maintenance and outages,  
ij
CAP  is adjusted to expected capacity by using the forced 
outage rate 
ij
FOR  specific to that unit. The 
ij
FOR  represents the probability of an unplanned outage in any given 
hour for that unit.  
 
Now we denote by 
i
q  the total output of electricity by firm i , that is, 
1
    1 2
in
i ij
j
q x , i , , ,n

  ,                     (5) 
and introduce the cost functions  i if q ,  1 2i , , ,n ,  as follows: 
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 
1
min   subject to (2), (3) ,(4) and (5)
in
i i ij ij
j
f q c x

 
  
 
 .                   (6) 
 
The following result is a direct consequence of the Linear Programming Sensitivity Analysis. 
 
Lemma 1.  Each function  i if q  defined by (6) is piece-wise linear and convex.             ■ 
 
The latter implies that at each point  
i
q  where the value  i if q  is finite, i.e.   i if q   ,  the cost function’s 
subdifferential is non-empty, i.e. 
                                                                                     
                                         i i i i i if q s R f q f q s , R             .                (7) 
At the points of differentiability,      i i i if q f ' q  .                             
 
Example 1.  Let  1 1 11 3 1 7 1 2 3j jn ,n ,CAP FOR , j , , ;     , 11 12 132 1 1c ,c ,c    and   
11
1 4RES _ RATIO  ,  
12
1 8RES _ RATIO  , 
13
1 2RES _ RATIO  .  Then it is easy to verify that 
                                         1 1 1 2 3min  2f q f q x x x        
                     subject to 
                                          
1 2 3
5 4 9 8 3 2 21x x x   , 
                                           
1 2 3
x x x q   , 
                                            0 7    1 2 3
j
x , j , , .   . 
Solving this linear programming problem, we find that 
 
                                      
11
12
                 0 14
2 14       14 16 1
7 94 5    16 1 16 16 917
              16 917
q, q ;
q , q . ;
f q
q . , . q . ;
, q . .
 

  
 
   
 
 
Therefore, 
                                     
 
 
 
  1112
1              0 14
1 2            14
2             14 16 1
2 7           16 1 16 16 917
               16 917
, q ;
, , q ;
f q , q . ;
, , . q . ;
, q . .
  



   

  
 
                                  ▀ 
 
           
Now we specify a notion of equilibrium.  Producer  i chooses its output volume 
i
q  so as to maximize its 
profit value     0i i i ip q f q , q    assuming that the choice may affect the price value p . The latter assumption 
could be defined by a conjectured dependence of the price p  upon the output value  
i
q . If so, the first order 
maximum condition to describe the equilibrium would have the form                                                  
 
 
If  0   then  0
If  0   then  0
i
i i i
i i
q , p
p q f q .
q , q
  
  
  
             (8) 
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Thus we see that to describe the agent’s behavior, not the dependence of p  upon iq  itself but its 
derivative 
i
i
p
v
q

 

 is important.  We introduce the minus here in order to deal with the positive values of iv . 
Of course, the conjectured dependence of p  upon iq  must provide (at least local) concavity of the i -th agent’s 
conjectured profit as the function of his output. Otherwise one cannot guarantee the profit to be maximized (but not 
minimized).  As we prove that the cost functions  i if q  are convex, then the concavity of the product ip q will 
do.  For instance, it is enough to assume the coefficient 
i
v (called from now on as the i -th agent’s influence 
coefficient) to be non-negative and constant.  Then the conjectured local dependence of the profit upon the 
production output 
i
  has the form    i i i i i ip v q f       , while the maximum condition at i iq   is 
provided by the relations 
 
 
 
    0
0                0
i i i i i
i i
p v q f q , q ;
p f ' , q .
   

 
              (9) 
 
In a sense, condition (9) determines an optimal response of firm i  to a given price p . 
 
Example 2.  In continuation of Example 1, assume that 
1
0 5.   . Now we can construct the optimal response 
curve by producer 1, namely  1q q q p,  , whose graph at a point p is the set of values 1q q  satisfying (9).  
As condition (9) in our particular case is reduced to  
 
 
 
11
12
1                       0
0 5 1            0 14
0 5 1 2      14
0 5 2            14 16 1
0 5 2 7      16.1;
0 5 7            16 1 16 16 917
p , q ;
p . q , q ;
p . q , , q ;
p . q , q . ;
p . q , , q
p . q , . q . ;
 

   
   

   
   

     
 
 
It is not difficult to verify that we thus obtain the following piece-wise linear function: 
 
 
 
 
  1124
0                    0 1
2 1         1 8
14                  8 9
0 5
2 2         9 10 05
16 1               10.05 15 05
2 7        15.05 15 15 458
, p ;
p , p ;
, p ;
q p, .
p , p . ;
. , p . ;
p , p . .
 

  
  
 
  
  

   
                     ▀ 
 
 
Lemma 2.  The optimal response functions   1 2i iq p, , i , , ,n  , are continuous piece-wise linear non-
decreasing functions of structure similar to that in Example 2. More precisely, if 
1 2
0
m
       are the 
points of non-differentiability of the cost function  i if q , then 
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 
 
      
     
        
1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 2
2
0                             0 0
1
0       0 0
                         inf sup
1
sup  sup sup ;
,           
i
i i i i
i
i i i i
i i i i i i i
i
, p f ' ;
p f ' , f ' p f ' ;
, f p f ;
q p, p f , f p f
 

      
       


 
   
     
          
     
        
2 2 2 2
1
               inf sup ;
                            
1
 sup  sup sup ; 
i i i i
i m i m i m i m i
i
f p f
p f , f p f q
     
     











      



          

 
 
The latter construction is well-defined, as it is shown while proving Lemma 1 that  
 
     1sup inf    2 3i k i kf f , k , , ,m.                                ▀ 
 
Now we introduce a notion of equilibrium which we call exterior (with parameters iv  given 
exogenously).  
 
Definition 1.  The set  1 np,q , ,q  is called  an exterior equilibrium for given influence coefficients  1 nv , ,v , 
if the market is balanced, i.e. condition (1) is satisfied, and for each i  the maximum conditions (9) are valid.  
 
To examine the existence of an equilibrium, we introduce some standard assumptions. 
 
A1.  The demand function is defined for prices  0p ,   being a non-increasing and piecewise continuously  
differentiable one. At each of the finite number of discontinuity points there exist left- and right-hand limits of both 
the function itself (due to its monotonicity) and its derivative.  
 
In what follows we are going to consider only the case when the participants set is constant independently 
from the values iv  of the influence coefficients. To provide for that we make the following assumption, similar to 
that in [7] and [9]. 
 
A2.  At the price   0
1
0
i
i n
p max f '
 
  for any i  there exists an output volume 
0
iq such that   00 inf i ip f q   
and  moreover,  0 0
1
n
i
i
q g p

 . 
The latter condition guarantees that for any iv  conditions (1) and (9) can hold together only for 
 0 0ip p f '  , and hence only for all iq  being   strictly positive.   
 
 
Now we introduce the upper limits for the total production of electricity by each firm. Indeed, let 
 
1
max  subject to (2)--(4)     1 2
jn
i ij
j
q x , i , , n.

  
  
  
                 (10) 
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For an exterior equilibrium to exist, it is crucial that the active demand D  satisfy the following assumption. 
 
A3.  There exists a price value 
1
p  such that   
 
   1
1
1
n
i
i
G p D q LOSS

   .                   (11) 
 
Assumption A3 provides for existing the production power enough to satisfy the cumulative demand, given 
the active demand D . Now, similar to [7] and [9], we can establish the following result. 
 
Theorem 1.   Under assumptions A1 and A2,  for any 0D   satisfying A3, and 0
i
v  , 1i , ,n , there exists  an 
exterior equilibrium  1 np,q , ,q . If the demand function is continuous and strictly decreasing, i.e. 
   g p G p   and     1 2G p G p   for 21 pp  ,  then the exterior equilibrium  nq,,q,p 1  exists uniquely 
and depends continuously upon the parameters set  nv,,v,D 1 .                     
Proof.  Let us introduce the total optimal response of the producers to price p as follows 
 
   
1
n
i i
i
Q p q p, .

                     (12) 
 
Due to Lemmas 1 and  2, the function  Q p  is  piece-wise linear continuous non-decreasing function. 
Now introduce  
 
      sup   1*p p Q p LOSS G p D .                     (13) 
 
Assumptions A2 and A3 guarantee that this value exists and is finite. As  ii ,pq   are continuous by  
Lemma 2, and  G p  is left-continuous by assumption A1, then      1* *Q p LOSS G p D   .  As the left limit 
of the demand function,  pg , is right-continuous by assumption A1, then were the inequality 
     1* *Q p LOSS g p D   valid, that would imply for some *pp   that 
 
       1* *Q p LOSS g p D G p D     , 
 
which contradicts (13). Therefore, we have 
 
       1* * *g p D Q p LOSS G p D     , 
 
that is, the vector   1* ** np ,q , ,q   with     1*i i *q q p , i , ,n  , satisfies both (1) and (9), hence it is an exterior 
equilibrium.   
 
The uniqueness of the exterior equilibrium in the particular case of  strict monotonicity of the continuous 
demand function    g p G p  is evident, as the equilibrium is then determined by a unique intersection point of 
the graphs of the strictly decreasing continuous function  G p D  and the non-decreasing continuous function 
   1Q p LOSS .   Thus, the equilibrium price *p , as well as the equilibrium production volumes 
    1*i i *q q p , i , ,n  , are determined uniquely, and the proof is completed.            ■ 
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Interior  Equilibrium 
 
In order to introduce an interior equilibrium, we have to be able to realize the procedure of verification of 
the influence coefficients iv  as it was given in [6]--[7],[9].  However, we cannot apply this procedure to our 
electricity model as the cost functions are piecewise linear (cf. Lemma 1 and Example 1) and hence their second 
derivative either is zero or do not exist (at the junction points).  To be able to verify the influence coefficients, we 
use a least squares approximation of the piecewise linear cost function 
i
f  by a quadratic cost function 
i
φ , 
1 2i , , ,n , as follows. 
 
For a fixed index i , let the cost function 
i
f  have the junction points 
0 1 2
0     
N
t t t t . We 
determine the quadratic function   212  i i i i i i iφ q a q b q c such that  
 
     
2 2
2 21 1
2 2
0 0 
              
N N
i i i i k i k i i k k k i k
a ,b ,c
k k
F a ,b ,c a t b t c f t min at bt c f t .              (14) 
 
Problem  (14) always has a solution.  
 
Example 3. To illustrate that, consider again the piecewise linear function from Example 1 and apply the least 
square method. The function in question has four junction points: 
0 1 2 3
0 14 16 1 16 917      t t t . t .  with 
       0 1 2 30 14 18 2 23 919   f t , f t , f t . , f t . . By solving problem (14) we find the quadratic approximation 
cost function   212  φ q aq bq c with  0 0890   0 5536   0 7030   a . , b . , c . .  The approximation error is 
 
1 2
3 48F a,b,c .    .  The second derivative is calculated as 0 0890 φ'' a . .   ■ 
 
Now we can introduce the interior equilibrium. Assume that we have an exterior equilibrium  nq,,q,p 1  
for the electricity market model with the piecewise linear cost functions 
i
f  replaced by the corrsponding quadratic 
approximations 1
i
φ ,i , ,n . Assume also that this exterior equilibrium has occurred for some nv,,v 1  and D. 
One of the producers, say k, temporarily changes his behavior by abstaining from maximization of the conjectured 
profit and making small fluxions around his equilibrium output volume kq . In mathematical terms it is tantamount 
to restricting the model agents to the subset ki   with the volume kq  subtracted from the active demand. 
Variation of agent k production output is then reduced to the same absolute value variation  (but to the opposite side) 
of the active demand kk qDD  . If we consider these variations being infinitesimal, we assume that by 
observing the corresponding variations of the equilibrium price, agent k gets the left-side and right-side derivatives 
of the equilibrium price with respect to the active demand, i.e. his left-side and right-side influence coefficients.  
If the equilibrium point 










n
i
iqG,p
1
belongs to the smooth part of the graph L of the demand function,  
then these derivatives values coincide, and the consistent (verified) influence coefficient also must be equal to this 
value. However, if (p,G) is a corner point, then the coefficient kv  is admitted as consistent if it lies between the 
left-side and right-side derivative values of the equilibrium price. Applying Theorem 1  [9] or, which is the same, 
formula (3) in [9], to calculate the derivatives, one has to remember that agent k is temporarily outside the 
equilibrium model, hence one has to exclude the addendum with the number i=k. Having that in mind, we come to 
the following criterion. 
 
Consistency Criterion.  At an exterior equilibrium  nq,,q,p 1  the influence coefficient kv  is admitted as 
consistent if there exists a value kr such that 
           0000  p'G,p'Gmaxrp'G,p'Gmin k  
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and  
 
1
1
k i i k
i k
v v a r



 
   
 
   
where   1
i i
a φ '', i , ,n  , i k . The  previous equality can be also rewritten as follows: 
 
1
1k
k
i k i i
v
r
v a




.              (15) 
 
Here the values  0p'G  and  0p'G are taken at the point 










DqG,p
n
i
i
1
 of the demand function graph 
L.  If kr  then  kv =0. 
 
Before we define the interior equilibrium we notice that when the equilibrium corresponds to a smooth 
point on the demand function graph then the numbers kr  must be equal for all k. Only if it is a vertex, i.e. if 
   00  p'Gp'G , the consistency criterion allows different values of  kr . Such a fact could be considered 
as natural if the graph’s breakpoints are admitted as being exact reflections of the modeled situation. However, if 
one treats the breakpoint as a convenient idealization of smooth curves with rapidly changing slops, one has to 
demand the equality of all kr  as it were the case with the smooth approximation of the demand curve. That is why 
such a case is considered distinctly in the definition of the interior equilibrium below, as it was done in [7] and [9]. 
 
Definition 2.  The collection  nn v,,v,q,,q,p  11  where n,,i,vk 10  , is referred to as an interior 
equilibrium if, for the considered influence coefficients the collection  nq,,q,p 1  is an exterior equilibrium, and 
the consistency criterion is satisfied for all k. Furthermore, if all kr  in (4) have the same value, then the interior 
equilibrium is called strong.  
 
The following theorem is an extension of Theorem 2 in [7], [9]. 
 
Theorem 2.  Under assumptions A1, A2 and A3, there exists a strong interior equilibrium.     ■ 
 
Demand Structure and Equilibrium 
 
This section examines how variations of the demand structure affect the equilibrium price and the aggregate 
electricity output. We are mostly interested not in quantitative variations but the qualitative ones predicted by the 
above introduced model. Although Theorems 1 and 2 of the existence of equilibrium are valid in the more general 
case of piecewise quadratic cost functions, to understand the analysis better, we will first consider pure quadratic 
cost functions, as in [7].   
 
Hence, recall again that we use the approximating quadratic cost functions of the form 
  2 2i i i i i i iφ q a q / b q c    where 0ib   and n,,i,ai 10  . If one is only interested in the strong interior 
equilibrium then formula (15) from the consistency criterion can be rewritten as follows: 
 
n,,k,
r
av
v
ki ii
k 1      
1
1






,                   (16) 
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where   0,r  . If  r , then equation (16) has the unique solution n,,i,vk 10  . Otherwise, the 
following assertion is valid. 
                 
Lemma 3. ([7]). For any  0,r   there is a unique solution of equation (16)   n,,k,rvv kk 1 , that 
depend continuously upon r. Furthermore,   0rvk  when r , and  rvk  strictly increases up to  0kv  
as r increases up to zero.      ■ 
 
Relations (9) for the approximating quadratic functions give the linear dependences   ii i
i i
p b
q p,v
v a



. 
Thus for each  0,r   one can determine n,,i,vk 1  from (16) and then construct the aggregate output 
function  
 
1
n
i
i i i
p b
Q p,r
v a



 . 
 
It is immediate that  r,pQ  strictly increases by p and strictly decreases with respect to r.  Therefore the 
intersection points of the straight lines  r,pQG   with the demand curve move steadily to the right as r grows 
from  up to 0. The straight line   ,pQG  describes the dependence of the aggregate output upon the price 
p in case of the perfect competition, when the producers exclude the possibility of their individual influence on the 
price. On the other hand, the straight line  0,pQG   corresponds to the maximum (for the given cost functions) 
claims of the individual influence. 
 
First consider the situation of Fig. 1. Here the passive demand  pG  is zero if *pp   but equals 0G  
when *pp  , that is, there is a momentary leap of demand. The right-side limit  pg  here is zero if *pp   and 
equals 0G  when *pp  . A positive active demand 0D  somewhat lifts the demand curve up. The straight lines 
numbered 0 to 2 are the graphs of the aggregate production for various values of r. More precisely, number 0 is 
attached to the case r , i.e. the perfect competition. Number 1 is assigned to the case r=0, whereas 2 is 
numbering the case of an intermediate value r  in which the aggregate production graph comprises the point 
 00 GD,p*  . Because   00 *p'G  and    0*p'G  at that point, then it represents an interior 
equilibrium. Another interior equilibrium is associated with the graph point  01 D,p  where 
    000 11  p'Gp'G and r=0.  Strictly speaking there is the third equilibrium in this situation, namely the 
point  0D,p*  which corresponds to some  0,rr  , as in this point one has    0p'G  and 
  00 p'G . However, the latter equilibrium is unstable: any growth of the active demand makes the price jump 
up to the value 1p . 
 
Now let the electricity market have the state  00 GD,p*   and the active demand D starts growing up 
thus lifting up the demand curve. Until  0DD  the situation keeps changing continuously with the price *p  
kept intact and the demand 0GD   satisfied completely.  The production of electricity increases on account of 
diminishing of the equilibrium influence coefficients (i.e. on account of r decreasing).  When the breakpoint of the 
demand curve reaches line 0 (that corresponds to  0DD  and to the perfect competition regime) then the price 
cannot be supported unchanged as 0iv , r , and they cannot be lowered anymore.  
 
The next stage of the process is reflected in Fig. 2. If the active demand belongs to the interval 
   000 GD,D , then the equilibrium is represented by the point   00 GD,p*  which corresponds to 
the perfect competition regime.  Here neither the electricity price nor the electricity output is affected by the active 
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demand value, but a deficit appears because the aggregate demand 0GD   is not satisfied. Along with the active 
demand growing up to the value  00 GD , the deficit will also go up to the passive demand value 0G . 
 
The third stage comes with the active demand exceeding the value of  00 GD . At this moment the 
equilibrium point   00 GD,p*  loses stability, the price jumps to the value *
*
pp   and the deficit vanishes 
due to the elimination of the passive demand. The electricity market jumps to a qualitatively new state. Although the 
aggregate production output has not fallen down, the prices are established on a level higher than the marginal costs. 
Further growing active demand will be satisfied completely on the account of the corresponding growth of price.  
 
Now suppose that the active demand starts going down. It is evident that the process will not be reversal 
one. The equilibrium point will stay on  line 1 until the active demand reaches the value 01 DD   and the price 
becomes equal to *p  but now at the lower production level than in the beginning of the process. Further falling 
active demand will force the electricity market  to jump to the initial state: the price *p  being intact, the output 
volume will increase up to 10 DG   having satisfied both the active and passive demands  
completely.  However, if the active demand returns only to its initial state 0D , the electricity market  keeps staying 
at the equilibrium point  01 D,p  of Fig. 1, the price will be fixed higher the critical price *p  for the passive 
demand, and only the active demand 0D will be satisfied.  
 
If the demand curve has not single but several steps, the behavior of prices will be similar. The only 
difference is in that the process will be repeated as many times as many steps there are to the right off line 0 in Fig. 
1.  Each leap of prices corresponds to a switch to a new regime, with an appropriate group of consumers abandoning 
the market and thus eliminating the deficit that had arisen before that.  
 
Now consider the case when the active demand is stable but the passive demand structure changes on 
account of, say, a variation of the consumption ability of a part of consumers.  We illustrate this process on an 
example of two groups of consumers in the absence of active demand. Again we restrict ourselves to an ideal case 
when the demand curve is a step function with two steps (Fig. 3).  The price *p1  is critical for the poorer group of 
consumers with consumption volume 1G , whereas the price 
**
pp 12   is such for the richer group with 
consumption volume 2G . The lines numbered by 0 and 1 have the same meaning as in the previous example, i.e. 
they are the aggregate production output graphs in the perfect competition regime and the maximum monopolistic 
tendencies regime, respectively. The intermediate graphs numbered as 2 and 3 are associated with two interior 
equilibria  211 GG,p*   and  22 G,p* .                                                                                     
 
Now suppose that the consumption ability of the first (the poorer) group of consumers goes down. This 
process can be modeled by diminishing the critical price 
*
p1 . For simplicity purpose, we ignore a possible 
decrease of the consumption volume 1G . Again, the first stage of the considered process consists in lowering of 
the influence coefficients thus approaching the perfect competition regime. 
 
This feature will be exposed by the market price going down with the production output unchanged and the  
aggregate demand satisfied. The price will be equal to the critical one for the poorer group of consumers. This will 
be taking place until the critical price reaches the level 1p  with the production switching to the perfect competition 
regime.  
 
At the second stage when the critical price for the first group of consumers lies in the interval  110 p,p , the 
market price keeps going down along with the critical one, the perfect competition keeps being valid, but the 
aggregate production volume starts decreasing and a deficit arises (see Fig. 4). The deficit will increase as the price 
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approaches the value 10p . If the consumption ability keeps lowering then the market price jumps up to the level 
*
p2 , and the electricity market makes a leap to the new equilibrium regime  22 G,p* . The poorer group of 
consumers abandons the market completely with the deficit eliminated.  
 
If the consumption ability of the first group recovers, the process is not reversed completely (if no special 
extraneous efforts are made).   
 
Conclusion 
 
The qualitative analysis of the equilibrium behavior in dependence on the active demand level for the 
electricity market model is realized based upon that performed in [7] and [9] for the case of pure quadratic ([7]) and 
piecewise quadratic ([9]) cost functions. The model in question necessarily has piecewise linear cost function. Such 
cost functions arise often when the model agents have several distinct production facilities among which they have 
to distribute the production volume so that the total cost be minimal. Therefore, to introduce the notion of interior 
equilibrium, we have to approximate these piecewise linear cost function by pure quadratic ones. For thus 
introduced pure quadratic approximating cost function, we are able to realize the qualitative analysis of the behavior 
of electricity prices and production outputs for the electricity market model.   
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